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Abstract
Recognizing the impact of religion on state action, this article identifies two variables that 
interact to affect the types and level of violence employed by Western states against Third 
World targets. First, variation in the degree to which the prominent Christian denominations
and organizations within these states view evangelization as either an individual-level or 
national-level process – Christian individualism vs. Christian nationalism – has determined 
church support for using violence as a tactic.  Second, the level of influence that churches 
and missionary organizations have over their home states affects the ability of Christian 
actors to directly impact state actions.  Western violence against Third World peoples is 
expected to be lowest when churches and Christian organizations view evangelization in 
primarily individualistic terms and have significant influence over the state.  The article 
examines the relationships between concepts of evangelization, Christian influence over 
state policies, and levels of violence against the Third World by examining British, French 
and German colonialism during the late colonial period of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
1 Introduction
Interactions between the First World and the Third World have been consistently 
conducted through violent means.  The brutality of the Crusaders’ actions in the Middle 
East during the 11
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th through 13th centuries set the precedent for violent enmity between Western 
Christianity and Islam and constituted “the first experiment in establishing a ‘Europe 
Overseas.’”  Subsequent European colonialism in the Americas, Africa and Asia used 
violence as a constitutive element of founding, legitimizing and maintaining empire; as a 
pedagogical tool for spreading “superior” culture and law; and as a strategic policy to 
enforce the norm of European supremacy. Even post Cold War military interventions in the 
Third World by North American and European forces, ostensibly meant to protect civilians 
from human rights abuses, generally involve directly inflicting violence against some Third 
World peoples in defense of others, not to mention intervening forces inadvertently killing 
non-combatants, arming certain local factions against others, and exacerbating existing 
local conflicts in the long run.  
In seeking to explain the persistent use of violence against the Third World, many 
scholars point toward economic motivations: the Crusades served as a catalyst for tax 
centralization and capital accumulation; Lenin famously characterized imperialism as the 
logical end of capitalist investment; military interventions and preemptive wars have given 
Western countries access to valuable natural resources.  Others point to racism and biases 
against non-White peoples, backed by philosophy and “science,” condoning the use of 
cruel force and providing impetus for “civilizing” missions to the “savage” parts of the 
world.  While these factors are no doubt important, it is also crucial to listen to what 
Western actors have stated as their own motivations, which points to a factor that is 
acknowledged in historical accounts of Western violence toward the Third World but rarely 
studied by international relations scholars: religion. 
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 Crusaders, colonizers, and interventionists have often cited or demonstrably drawn 
upon Christian principles to motivate or justify their uses of force against Third World 
actors.  A central tenet of Christianity is evangelization, spreading the euangelion (Greek 
for “Gospel” or “good news”) concerning Jesus Christ, with an aim toward converting 
unbelievers.  Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism) is particularly 
evangelical, placing emphasis on proselytizing unbelievers based on the Gospel, drawing 
upon the biblical Great Commission from Jesus for his followers to “ Go therefore 
and make disciples of all nations.” While early Christians conducted this mission in the face 
of state persecution within the Roman Empire, Christianity became the state religion of 
Rome in the fourth century, granting the Church the ability to direct state violence toward 
punishing non-believers and heretics, with the ultimate goal of converting them. 
“Evangelical violence” became a tool of the Church.  
 This article argues that First World states’ use or refrain from using violence against 
Third World peoples has often been impacted or constrained by “the Church,”
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 Christian denominations and organizations located in or tied to Western states, but that this 
influence is variable, depending on both the Church’s conception of its evangelical mission 
and the Church’s level of influence over the state.  The rest of the article proceeds as 
follows. Section 2 identifies two variables, Christian nationalism vs Christian individualism 
and Church influence over the state, that affect the willingness and ability of Western 
Christian actors to support or constrain violence committed by their home states against the 
non-Western world.   Section 3 examines the relationships between these variables and 
First World violence against the Third World through three case studies of late European 
colonialism.  Section 4 discusses further implications of the study of Church motivations 
and influence concerning Western interventions.
2 Nationalism vs. Individualism, Christian Influence, and Evangelical Violence
While Christian actors have sometimes accepted violence as an acceptable tacic for 
spreading the Gospel, the utility of using force to gain converts depends on how the 
Church views the nature of the goal that it is trying to accomplish. The Great Commission 
expresses two conceptions of the targeted audience for evangelism: individuals (the 
potential “disciples”) and people groups (the “nations” from which these potential disciples 
come), and Christians have disagreed, theologically and practically, concerning the primary 
level at which evangelism operates.  Throughout this essay, I will distinguish these two 
conceptions as “Christian individualism,” a belief that God’s salvation and subsequent 
work are primarily performed on and by individuals, and “Christian nationalism,” a belief 
that God mainly saves nations and operates through nations, states or empires.,  
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Both individualism and nationalism have remained present in Christian evangelistic 
thought, but the relative emphasis of one conception over the other has changed over time 
and across denominations and countries within Western Christendom. Various scholars 
have identified the concept of “individualism” as an idea novel to Christianity, or 
Protestantism in particular; Christian individualism is thought by some to have culminating 
in Calvinism, or in the Evangelicalism that emerged in nineteenth century America.  Most 
scholars examining Christian nationalism discuss it within the context of nations’ domestic 
politics, such as the Calvinist Afrikaner self-conceptions in South Africa or efforts in North 
American to elect Christians to public office and to establish laws based on biblical 
principles. Baker, Hurwitz and Nelson (2008) are among the few scholars who recognize 
the long history and the foreign policy implications of Christian nationalism, the belief “that 
God identifies with some nations, either blessing or punishing those ‘’chosen’ nations 
according to their faithfulness;” they point toward the Crusades and the Puritan’s approach 
to the New World as manifestations of such belief..
The relative strengths of Christian nationalism and Christian individualism in the 
thinking of the Western Church have impacted the calculations the Church makes 
concerning the use of violence as an evangelical tool. When evangelization is viewed as a 
national-level project, violence can be a useful tool for installing Christian governments and 
enforcing Christian ideals, and churches and missionaries will be more willing to encourage 
their states to use violence to exert First World power over Third World areas. However, 
when evangelization and salvation are seen as individual level processes, violence appears 
as a less useful or just method for convincing non-Christians to believe; churches that view  
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evangelization in individual terms will therefore be more hesitant to cooperate with 
or encourage state violence, and may actually oppose efforts by their states to use force 
against potential Third World converts. Thus, all else being equal, violent interventions will 
be more frequent and more brutal when a Christian nationalist perspective dominates 
Church thinking. Tensions between these two points of view have driven past debates 
concerning the Church’s endorsement of the use of force against non-believers. For 
example, Rivera and Pagán (1992) discuss the debates that occurred within Spanish and 
Catholic Church circles concerning the validity and usefulness of employing force to 
convert indigenous population during the New World conquest.
The impact of the Church on states’ use of violence, however, depends not only on 
the churches’ ideas, but also on the nature and degree of church influence over the state, 
which has similarly varied across time and country throughout the history of Christianity. 
At times, the Church exercised direct temporal power, as with the Papal States, or was 
intimately integrated into secular power structures, such as crowning the Holy Roman 
Emperor.  In other locations and periods –the disestablishment of the Catholic Church 
during the French Revolution or the suppression of Protestants in the aftermath of the 
Reformation – Christians have been excluded from political power or actively persecuted. 
Between these extremes, Catholic and Protestant churches have enjoyed various degrees of 
influence over secular Western governments, based on a variety of factors, methods and 
tactics  Several scholars highlight churches’ ability to influence public opinion, which in 
turn influences public policy, particularly in electoral democracies where churches can 
influence voter preferences.
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 Others point toward the Church’s ability to ally with political parties or factions, 
exchanging moral support for policy concessions.  Grzymala-Busse points toward formal 
but often covert institutional access by the church to the state, such as power to author 
legislation, positions within executive or legislative branches of government, and control 
over social services or other state functions. 
Many other factors also influence church impact over state policy, including specific 
historical developments within a given state, the faiths of secular rulers within the state, the 
types of political system in effect, and the relative resources of the church and the state, 
among other considerations.   It is beyond the scope of this study to fully generalize the 
conditions under which churches gain significance influence over state policies.  This 
article will therefore treat Church influence as an independent variable and measure this 
variable in the cases under study through historical analysis that identifies the limits and 
methods of Christian impact on state policies for each case.
This article argues that the interaction of these two variables, the degree of Christian 
nationalism or individualism in church doctrine and the extent of church influence over the 
state, has had a significant but underappreciated impact on the use of evangelical violence. 
This analysis owes a great debt to Daniel Philpott, who uses a similar two-variable 
framework to explain the political actions of religious actors, including violence.
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   Philpott’s independent variables, political theology, “the set of ideas that a 
religious body holds about legitimate political authority” and differentiation, “the degree of 
mutual autonomy between religious bodies and state institutions in their foundational legal 
authority” are broadly similar to the ones presented here, but with important differences.  
“Christian nationalism” and “Christian individualism” are ideas rooted in theology, but they 
concern more fundamental beliefs about the nature of God and humans than political 
theology, which is a more derivative and normative concept concerning church-state 
relations. Church influence, meanwhile, is here defined less formally than differentiation, 
which is largely a legal concept.  Influence reflects politics and practical, informal 
arrangements as much as formal laws and policies.  Churches and Christian leaders with no 
official role in government have often had high levels of de facto influence, while 
established churches are often ceremonially connected to government but play no practical 
role in policy.  Nonetheless, the interaction between the two variables presented here 
impacts evangelical violence in similar ways to Philpott’s explanations for religious political 
activity. When the Church holds an individualistic view of evangelism and enjoys 
significant influence over the state, violence against Third World targets is constrained, 
although not eliminated.  When the church holds highly nationalist views and/or has no 
practical influence over policy, Western governments have exercised little restraint on the 
use of force when such violence serves states’ interests.  For cases in between these more 
extreme situations, the Church has been able to exercise moderate or evolving influence 
over state affairs, leading to instances in which state violence is inconsistent or changes 
over time. 
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The next section of this article will examine the relationships between Christian 
nationalism or individualism, Church influence on the state, and level of state violence 
through case studies of British, French and German colonialism of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, during which time the major European powers acquired, maintained and 
eventually lost massive colonial holdings throughout Africa, Asia and the Pacific. 
Examining three cases allows for in-depth analyses of the proposed connections between 
the variables under consideration.  Focusing on this era of late imperialism is advantageous 
for several reasons. First, by keeping the time period consistent across cases, general 
European norms and practices about violence are kept relatively constant.  By the 1800s, 
European states had become more restrictive of certain aspects of state violence, such as 
torture or executions. Furthermore, whereas in previous centuries, European states largely 
relied on mercenaries, mercantile companies and privateers to carry out external violence 
on behalf of the state, from the nineteenth century on these states directly controlled their 
armed forces and had effectively disarmed international non-state actors; thus, Church 
influence over state policies toward violence could be directly translated into action without 
being mediated by the decisions or preferences of private actors.  Additionally, the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany held similar beliefs and norms toward empire-building 
during this time, which were expressed and homogenized through periodic summits 
conducted under the Concert of Europe and through specific events, such as the 1884-1885 
Berlin Conference, which set rules for colonial conquest and imperialism.    
Second, this time period had fully absorbed the norms and ideas of the 
Enlightenment, including the principle of separation of church and state. This makes the 
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time period a “hard case” for measuring church influence over state violence; if the 
Church’s influence over states’ use of force can be identified here, it will imply that such a 
relationship also existed for cases of closer church-state relationships, such as the Catholic 
Crusader states or the church-backed monarchies that colonized the Americas. Finally, 
these three powers established the three largest world empires during the time period: 
Britain held most of the Indian subcontinent, dominated the eastern half of Africa (“from 
Cape Town to Cairo”) and significant parts of West Africa, among its many territories 
circling the globe; France colonized much of West and Northern Africa and mainland 
Southeast Asia; while Germany, a latecomer to colonialism, managed to secure colonies in 
Africa and the Pacific, most notably modern day Cameroon, Togo, Namibia, Tanzania, 
New Guinea and Samoa. Focusing on these three empires holds similar the scale and scope 
of potential colonial violence used by these states and providing ample data to analyze the 
actual uses of force by these states against peoples in Africa and Asia.
As the following discussion will show, British Christians of the 19
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th and 20h centuries, heavily influenced by the Evangelical movement that 
originated in the United Kingdom, held a highly individualistic view of conversion. 
Furthermore, British Evangelicals were well placed within the government and in the 
colonies to influence colonial policies. Thus, British colonialism of this era became 
relatively less violent than that of other European powers.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, the German missionary societies that dominated Christian evangelization were, 
for most of the period under study, dominated by a nationalist ethos, although a more 
individualist outlook held sway among missionaries in the German colonies for a portion of 
this period.  Regardless, the missionaries were general disorganized, the major churches in 
Germany were decentralized, and the German government intentionally excluded these 
religious actors from having political influence.  German colonialism was therefore 
unconstrained by the churches and missionaries, and German colonies were subjected to 
notoriously high levels of violence.  
Between these two examples lies French church-state relations and colonialism.  
The majority Catholic Church was largely disenfranchised France during this period, but 
the number, expertise, resources and longstanding presence of Catholic missionaries in 
many French colonies gave the Church a moderate amount of influence with colonial 
administrators, and political developments in Paris eventually softened the government’s 
anti-Catholic stance.  Furthermore, French Catholics initially presented a highly 
nationalistic view of their mission, largely as a response to accusations they were facing in 
France.  As anti-Catholicism eventually softened, and as the Vatican called on (French) 
Catholics to put Christian mission ahead of national allegiance, the Church’s stance shifted 
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away from Christian nationalism, and these changes combined allowed French 
Catholics to eventually moderate French colonial violence.  Table 1 presents angeneral 
representation of the relative distribution of Christian individualism or nationalism, Church 
influence over the state, and colonial violence for the three case studies.
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Table 1 European Colonial Violence and its Determinants
Table 1 European Colonial Violence and its Determinants
Christian Nationalism 
Dominates Church 
View of 
Evangelization
Mix of Christian 
Nationalism and 
Christian 
Individualism
Characterize Church 
Views of 
Evangelization
Christian
Individualism  
Dominates Church 
View of
Evangelization
High Level of 
Church Influence 
on State
Low Levels of 
Colonial Violence
British Imperialism, 
(~1805-1968)
Moderate or 
Inconsistent Level 
of Church 
Influence on State
Moderate or 
Inconsistent Levels of 
Colonial Violence
French Imperialism
(1830-1960)
Low Level of 
Church Influence 
on State
High Levels of 
Colonial Violence
German Imperialism
(1871-1918)
3  British, French and German Colonial Violence in Comparative Perspective
3.1 Comparing Colonial Violence
 Attempting to compare levels of colonial violence between European empires is an 
extremely difficult endeavor.  All empires resorted to significant uses of force to acquire 
13
and maintain their colonial possessions at times committing unspeakable atrocities against
and maintain their colonial possessions, at times committing unspeakable atrocities against 
native peoples. Furthermore, former colonial states have generally sought to dismiss or de-
emphasize the direct violence and indirect sufferings inflicted by their colonial exercises; 
the United Kingdom, in particular, has often downplayed its more brutal tactics in India, 
Kenya, South Africa and Malaya, among other locations.  Even acknowledging the scope 
of British colonial force, however, it can still reasonably be argued that British colonialism 
was on average less direct, less violent, and less deleterious for colonial subjects than the 
colonial practices of other colonizers, particularly the French.  Making a comparison to 
German colonial violence is more challenging, as the German colonial empire was smaller 
and shorter-lived than the British or French empires, and German overseas imperialism 
ended abruptly in the First World War, meaning that the German state was not faced with 
the wars of decolonization that followed WWII. Even so, during its relatively few years of 
world empire, Germany committed a series of notorious atrocities, such as the near 
extermination of the Herero and Nama peoples of German South West Africa (present-day 
Namibia) in what is considered the first genocide of the 20th century. Comparing French 
and German policies in Africa, Langbehn and Salama write: 
Apart from forced labor schemes, there were other similarities between the French 
and German colonial policies. Military power played a special role in both empires; 
state-sanctioned violence conquered and subjugated the colonial hinterlands. Any 
resistance or uprising was brutally squashed, but the similarities ended there. On the 
French side there seem to have been no genocidal wars on the scale of the Herero 
War.
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The suppression of the Maji Maji rebellion in German East Africa (1905-1907), 
which likewise killed up to 100,000 Africans, has generally been regarded as a uniquely 
deadly conflict within colonial East Africa (although recent scholarship on the later British 
suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion in neighboring Kenya (1952-1964) suggests that the 
latter conflict may have been similarly deadly).
More direct comparisons can be made by examining instances where German,  
British and French colonial efforts coexisted in the same or neighboring territories, or when 
colonies passed from one of these powers to another.  For example, the colony of 
Cameroon was a German possession before being partitioned by Britain and France after 
WWI. Germany extracted forced labor from the local population during its rule, a policy 
that was reestablished (on more lenient terms) by France, while Britain never employed 
forced labor in its Cameroon colony, reflecting the generally greater prevalence and 
longevity of forced labor in French colonies compared to British territories in Africa. In 
Togoland, touted by Germany as its “model colony,” German policies of forced labor and 
reprisals against the local populations led to “many Togolanders simply migrat[ing] to the 
British-ruled Gold Coast to escape German rule,” while those who remained welcomed the 
French and British troops who captured the colony in 1914. In Samoa, which was 
partitioned between British, German and US forces in the late 1800s, criticism against 
especially aggressive German tactics came from many sources, including the international 
press; public and private diplomatic correspondences from British and American sources; 
and even the French Catholic Bishop of Fiji. 
Another direct comparison between these three imperial powers comes from the 
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1899-1901 Boxer Rebellion against foreign presence in China, which was 
suppressed by “the first multinational intervention force in military history,” drawn from 
Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  Despite atrocities such as mass killings, rapes and looting committed by all 
intervening forces, of which “the conduct of the Russian soldiers [was] atrocious, and the 
French [were] not much better,” the German troops stood out to both Chinese and foreign 
observers for their “cruelty, extreme violence, and unpredictable behavior,” as demonstrated 
by the massacre of hundreds of defenseless Chinese in the city of Yongqing in 1901.   
Although far from precise, these examples suggest that the impression of German 
colonialism as most violent and British colonialism as least violent is broadly accurate.
While the literature on colonialism allows for imperfect comparisons of the violence 
committed by different imperial powers, fewer studies have examined the underlying 
causes of these differences, which this article argues are largely rooted in the divergent 
religious traditions and church-states relations of England, France and Germany. All three 
states had disestablished or marginalized the Catholic Church within their territories, but 
subsequent church-state relations differed substantially between the three countries.  King 
Henry VIII pulled England into the Reformation in 1534 by wresting control of the Church 
of England from the papacy, establishing a national Anglican Church with the monarch as 
its head, and the UK eventually saw a number of other Protestant traditions take hold 
among segments of the British population, as well.  By the 19
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th century, an individualistic, conversion-focused and politically-active movement 
known as Evangelicalism had spread significantly across these denominations, with 
members dominating missionary societies and represented in high levels of government and 
administration, In France, despite the secular radicalism of the Revolution and subsequent 
Republican governments,  the international resources and connections of the Catholic 
Church and its sustained numerical superiority within French society ensured that the 
Church could not be eliminated in France and that it would remain a significant partner in 
colonial efforts abroad. The French Church, meanwhile, shifted over time from a focus on 
spreading French influence and culture to an emphasis on Christian mission above 
nationalism. Germany was united in the late 19th century, with its architect, Chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck, cracking down on the Catholic minority while also limiting the political 
influence of the Protestant majority’s churches. Meanwhile, the missionaries in German 
colonies were heavily influenced by the nationalism of the new German Empire. The 
following subsections highlight these differences in church ideologies, church influence 
over state colonial policies, and colonial violence.
3.2 British Evangelicalism and Constraints on Empire
To argue that German or French colonialisms were especially violent is not to deny 
that violence was also an intrinsic part of the British colonial effort and a companion to 
British Christian missions. The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 established a precedent for using 
“extreme violence” to maintain colonial rule in India, and British officials did not hesitate to 
engage in disproportionate uses of force to maintain colonial rule in South Africa, Palestine, 
Malaya, and Kenya, as well.
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  The case of Kenya, site of the Mau Mau rebellion (1952-1964), is illustrative.  
Consistent with general British counter insurgency tactics settlers used techniques
Consistent with general British counter-insurgency tactics, settlers used techniques 
including corporal punishment, torture, massacres, mass internment and coerced 
confessions, to quash rebellion and keep the native population under control.  British 
imperialism nevertheless enjoyed widespread support among the British population.  “Both 
liberals and conservatives in Britain believed in the superiority of British colonial rule. 
Unlike other European nations, so it was thought, Britain avoided the corrupting effects of 
absolute power in its colonies because of its higher, Christian moral principles and 
economic know-how.” 
Nevertheless, Britain’s reputation for using less violence than other European 
powers has validity.  Woodberry argues that the generally lower level of violence inflicted 
by British colonialism compared to other European powers only became a reality in the 19
18
th and 20th centuries, and he directly traces this divergence to the impact of Christian 
groups, including Evangelicals.  Evangelicalism, in the modern sense of the term, first 
emerged in the United Kingdom as a distinct movement within Christianity during the First 
Great Awakening, a Protestant religious revival of the mid-1700s that emphasized personal 
experience with God. Evangelicalism in Britain is a cross-denominational Protestant 
movement, with  contingents both in the established Anglican Church and in the 
“Nonconformist” churches (such as the Baptists, Methodists and Quakers) who existed 
outside of the official Church of England.  Across denominations, Evangelicals are 
characterized by an emphasis on the centrality of Christ’s atoning sacrifice, the authority of 
the Bible, the importance of an individual conversion experience, and the necessity of 
Christian activism in spreading the Gospel.
The Evangelicals’ focus on conversion and activism led them to become critics of 
British colonialism, and their outspokenness and organizing led to reforms within the 
empire.  Most notably, Evangelicals within the Anglican Church led the abolitionist 
movement that culminated with Britain both banning the slave trade (1807) and slavery 
itself within its own borders (1833) and patrolling the high seas to curtail other European 
states’ engagement in the trade.
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  The Evangelical opposition to slavery, however, did not simply stem from moral 
disgust at the brutality of enslavement, which Evangelicals had recognized long before they 
started opposing the institution. Rather, the Evangelicals eventually began to see slavery as 
a direct impediment to evangelizing enslaved populations, and it was this perception of 
incompatibility between maintaining slavery and maximizing conversions that led 
Evangelical activists to advocate for sacrificing the former in service of the latter.  
British Evangelicals’ humanitarian activism, strategically employed to promote their 
conversion efforts, was politically effective. The case of India, the “Crown Jewel of the 
British Empire,” is illustrative.  Many British Evangelical Christians objected to the 
excesses of colonial conquests such as the campaigns in India (as did British Utilitarians, 
for different reasons). British missionaries had to fight to be admitted into India; in 1813, 
the missionaries finally overcame opposition from the East India Company, which feared 
that missionaries would be a destabilizing influence. Fulfilling these fears, missionaries 
established themselves as strong opponents of excessive colonial violence.  While British 
Christians directly denounced some of the more violent aspects of British colonialism in 
India, their larger impact came from vocally allying with Indian activists and organizations, 
including early support for Gandhi and for the Indian National Congress, that advocated for 
Indian rights and eventually independence.   Much as was the case for Evangelical 
opposition to slavery, British Christian support for Indian rights and Indian nationalism was 
motivated by strategic concerns; these views were popular among potential converts, and 
adopting pro-Indian stances thus allowed missionaries to attract more followers to 
Christianity.
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In India, Africa and elsewhere, Woodberry and others note how “missionaries 
restrained the British government’s ability to use violence.” British missionaries employed 
nonviolent protest tactics, including lobbying and propaganda, and missionaries formed a 
number of social reform organizations aimed at improving conditions in the colonies, 
including the Anti-Slavery Society, The Aborigines Protection Society, and The Society for 
the Suppression of the Opium Trade. Furthermore, missionary publications were very 
popular in the west, and they used their newsletters and reports to spread word of colonial 
abuses (while also fundraising for further endeavors).Missionary campaigns in the British 
colonies met with a number of successes. After the abolition of slavery, missionaries also 
campaigned against forced labor, particularly in Africa.  When European settlers pressured 
the colonial government of Kenya to institute a forced labor program in 1919, for example, 
missionary outrage led the government to reverse its decision in 1921. Evangelicals also 
opposed hostile and arbitrary settler home rule in colonies such as New Zealand. Public 
embarrassment campaigns caused several public officials and politicians to lose their offices 
over the use of “extreme violence” in the colonies.
While British Evangelicals disapproved of the worst violence associated with 
Britain’s imperialism, they largely supported the British Empire as a means of bringing 
Christianity and order to subjected populations, who they deemed socially inferior. 
Evangelicals and other Protestants were so effective at limiting the extremes of colonial 
violence because they were closely tied to the colonial infrastructure of the state.  Many 
British Evangelicals were Members of Parliament, such as famed abolitionists William 
Wilberforce and Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, while Evangelicals such as James Stephens 
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and Lord Glenelg occupied top positions in the Colonial Office. British Evangelical 
politician, MP and eventual Prime Minister William Gladstone, who has been described as 
“combining liberalism and evangelical moralism” in his political views was often a vocal
“combining liberalism and evangelical moralism” in his political views, was often  a vocal 
critic of British colonial violence, opposing the forced opium trade in China and subsequent 
Opium War, the Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-1880, and the Zulu War of 1879.  British 
Christians also held significant power in the colonies themselves. Whereas the French 
colonial structure limited and ultimately expropriated missionary education, British colonies 
subsidized and relied heavily on mission schools to educate local populations and the 
colonists’ own children as well, giving missionaries significant influence over local colonial 
policies. Thus well-placed Christian political figures and important missionary institutions 
in the colonies all contributed to the overall colonial effort, but they were also able to reign 
in British excesses.  
Lest the role of British Evangelicals and other missionaries be painted in too 
favorable a light, it should be acknowledged that British missionaries were often complicit 
in the violence committed by the colonial state when mission and state interests aligned.
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   Notably, few missionaries condemned the practices used by the British to 
suppress the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, reflecting both the popularity of the military action 
in Britain and the fact that many of the rebellion’s targets had been Indian Christians. 
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Similarly, several mission churches were active in the efforts to suppress the Mau Mau 
rebellion in Kenya, a movement that specifically targeted colonists and Christians alike. In 
a practice inaugurated by the Anglican archbishop of Mombasa (whose residence stood just 
outside the gates of the Government House, symbolizing the close relationship between 
church and colonial state), detained Mau Mau suspects went through church-led “cleansing 
ceremonies” in which they “confessed” their crimes, renounced their rebel oaths, and gave 
declarations of Christian faith. 
Even with these exceptions to the Evangelical campaigns against colonial violence, 
by the time the British colonies began to gain independence after World War II, the overall 
impact of Christian values on British policies was evident.  Although the British still used 
violent means to attempt to prolong imperialism in the mid 20th century, including 
suppression of the Mau Mau in Kenya and the massacre of protesting Indians at Amritsar in 
1919, Britain eventually let go of its colonies without resorting to the long, bloody wars 
against independence that raged in French Algeria or Indochina; Woodberry credits earlier 
missionary condemnations of colonial violence, such as the use of concentration camps in 
the Boer War or the suppression of the 1865 rebellion in Morant Bay, Jamaica, with 
“training” the British to eventually let go of their colonies peacefully.
In short, British Christians of the 19
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th and 20th centuries, particularly Evangelicals involved in missionary activities, 
held personalistic view of conversion that eventually led them to develop a fear of 
alienating potential converts through excessive violence, and the Evangelical’s political 
savvy and connections allowed them to constrain British colonial violence.  Woodberry 
sums it up thus:
Prior to the rise of the Nonconformist missionary movement, British colonialism 
was virtually indistinguishable from other forms of colonialism. However, in the 
19th and 20th centuries this changed. In multiple ways, the British became less 
abusive, ended their abuses earlier, and were more likely to punish abusive colonial 
officials than other European colonial governments. Historical evidence suggests 
that these patterns are directly linked to differences in missionary influence between 
these colonizers. 
3.3 French Republican Colonialism, Anti-Clericalism and (Secular) Evangelism
French colonialist attitudes generally reflected the secularization and anti-clericalism 
that characterized Republican France, putting them at odds with the missionaries who 
operated within French imperial territories.
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 Following the violent suppression of the Catholic hierarchy during the Revolution, 
the French Republic’s disdain for the Catholic Church led them to not simply diminish or 
marginalize Catholicism. Rather, the revolutionaries and their successors, motivated by a 
combination of awe and disdain for the trappings of the Catholic religion, actively sought 
“to create a secular nation that emulated Catholic practices,” including such blatant acts as 
publicly erecting stone tablets inscribed with the Declarations of the Rights of Man instead 
of the Ten Commandments; replacing the Virgin Mary with the secular Marianne; and 
converting the church dedicated to St. Genevieve, patron saint of Paris, into the Pantheon, a 
mausoleum for secular French heroes. The Revolutionary and Republican governments 
also emulated their Catholic and monarchist predecessors in moral absolutism and 
missionary zeal:
Just as pious men and women believed God had chosen France to deliver 
Catholicism to the world, ardent republicans considered their own liberal ideas to be 
the nation’s gift to humanity. Republican values were every bit as universal – or so 
their sponsors claimed (regularly turning a blind eye to the women and non-
Europeans excluded from its most basic promises) – as faith or salvation. And like 
their Christian forebears, these values were eminently exportable. Spreading them 
became the central tenet of the ideology behind republican colonialism.
This enthusiasm manifested in large numbers of French citizens traveling abroad to 
support the colonial effort.  In Africa, for example, France had nearly twice as many 
colonial administrators in its territories than did the British in their African possessions, 
even though France had half as many African subjects as Britain.
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  Not to be outdone by their secular countrypersons, religious French Catholics also 
remained enthusiastic about propagating their faith abroad, largely as a substitute for their 
loss of place at home. French Catholic missionaries in the colonies “vastly outnumbered” 
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French colonial administrators.  By the end of the 19th century,  “two-thirds of the 
approximately 14,000 priest working outside of Europe were French.” (
French) Catholic ideas regarding nationalism and individualism were complex 
during this period.  On the one hand, missionary work in Africa, for example, focused on 
direct individual conversion, and prominent Catholic actors such as French-born Cardinal 
Charles Lavigerie, Archbishop of Algiers and later Carthage, worked diligently to organize 
international support against slavery in Africa. On the other hand, as late as 1866, official 
Catholic Church decrees held that slavery did not violate natural law, seemingly 
unconcerned with the implications for African conversion. Catholic leaders, meanwhile, 
tended to express their ambitions in nationalistic and imperial terms, often referencing the 
Crusades. Lavigerie, while expressly concerned with the “200 million souls” in Africa, was 
also a shrewd political actor who helped engineer the French colonization of Tunisia in 
order to cut off Italian expansion into the area, and he later organized his own armed militia 
in North Africa. Pope Gregory XVI spoke of a desire to “envelop the earth in a network of 
missions,” while the head of the Société des Missions Étrangères stated in 1931 that “in the 
colonies, as elsewhere, the missions have only one goal, exclusive of any other: to convert 
pagan lands to Christianity.” French Catholics during this period thus displayed a mixture 
of Christian individualism and Christian nationalism in their approach to the colonies.
Despite mistrust and hostility emanating from both sides, French colonialists and mi 
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ssionaries nonetheless formed mutually supportive relationships, with the 
missionaries supplying much of the education, healthcare and socialization into French 
culture, while the colonial administration provided the physical force necessary to enforce 
subjugation and protect both religious and secular French ex-patriots.  The mere size and 
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scope of the French Catholic missionary presence gave the Catholic Church some level of 
influence in colonial France. Prior to 1885, virtually all Catholic missionaries in Western, 
Central and Southern Africa were French.  At the start of the Scramble for Africa, it was 
French Catholic missionaries who possessed the experience and on-the-ground expertise 
that secular French colonialists would find useful for securing French territory on the 
continent.   Additionally, while secular French society was initially resistant to financing 
education and social services in the colonies during the early years of colonialism in Africa, 
missionaries were happy to provide these services in order to attract converts.  French 
missionaries had even older and more established roots in Indochina; by the 1880s, French 
Catholics had operated in the region for centuries and established hundreds of thousands of 
local Catholics, as well as hundreds of schools and chapels. Due to their reliance on the 
French colonial apparatus and their insecurity vis-à-vis the French state, however, French 
Catholic missionaries were limited in their freedom to place checks on they systematic 
savagery inflicted by the colonial regime, although this relationship between missionaries 
and colonizers varied by location, circumstance and time. These complex relationships can 
be examined by focusing on the interplay between Church and colonial state in French 
Indochina, Senegal and Algeria, largely considered the most important French colonies in 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, respectively.  
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In 19th century French Indochina, missionaries in major urban areas, where local 
resistance to French rule included violence against Christian converts, relied on French 
forces for protection and eagerly served as translators and guides for the colonial 
administration, whereas missionaries in more remote areas enjoyed greater autonomy and 
friendlier relationships with local peoples and were more ambivalent about French colonial 
presence. Later, as the Vietnamese independence movement’s communist character brought 
it into conflict with the Vietnamese Catholics, the Church was silent as colonial suppression 
in French Indochina in the 1940s-1950s included widespread sexual abuse of Vietnamese 
women, torture of suspected insurgents, and even incidents in which captured subversives 
were forced to execute friends and relatives.
Catholic influence in French sub-Saharan Africa largely centered on issues of 
forced labor.  Slavery, officially outlawed in all French territories by the Revolution, was 
still being openly tolerated in French colonies such as Senegal in the 1890s, despite official 
French efforts to deny this reality, and forced labor persisted for decades after this. Around 
the turn of the century, high-ranking French church officials like Cardinal Lavigerie and 
Archbishop Alexandre Le Roy, heads of the White Fathers and the Spiritan orders, 
respectively, led efforts to strengthen international anti-slavery laws and policies, but these 
efforts were initially met with French resistance. 
Within the African colonies themselves, the influence of the Catholic Church 
waxed and waned over time, largely due to events happening in Europe. The early 1900s 
were a low point for Church influence in the colonies. The French government assumed 
more direct control of colonial education and cut subsidies for mission schools.
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  Between 1903-1913, an anti-Catholic government closed many Catholic 
institutions in France, “reduc[ing] the number of missionaries with political connections in 
the colonizing state - the very people who could most easily pressure the home government 
to moderate colonial abuses.” The separation of church and state in France, codified in 
1905, gave the French Church little opportunity to influence colonial administration or curb 
violence. 
The complicated and often antagonistic relationships between Catholic missionaries 
and colonial administrators in Senegal highlight the ebb and flow of Church influence on 
colonial policies toward forced labor and other forms of colonial violence.  When World 
War I engulfed Europe, missionaries in Senegal picked their battles with colonial officials; 
for instance, they offered little opposition to the harsh tactics of forced conscription, a new 
application of the principle of compelled labor, used against Africans during the war, afraid 
that criticism would be equated with lack of patriotism.  After the war, however, Catholic 
missionaries became bolder.  In part, this was due to a new stance taken by the Vatican.  In 
a move thought to be largely targeting the French Church in particular, in 1919 Pope 
Benedict XV issued the encyclical Maximum Illud,, which officially denounced 
“missionary nationalism” and commanded overseas clergy to prioritize propagation of the 
faith and maximizing the number of converts ahead of allegiance to their countries of 
origin.
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 This letter clearly shifted the mission of the Church from a perspective of Christian 
nationalism to one of Christian individualism.  In Senegal, the Church’s renewed postwar 
focus on its African converts manifested in protests against forced labor, as well as 
advocacy for the rights of African women, a cause that Archbishop Le Roy championed, 
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as well. These efforts eventually bore fruit back in France, where the Popular Front 
government of the mid-1930s took up the issues of African forced labor and women’s 
rights, enacting reforms that filtered back to the colonies.
The French endeavor in Algeria was especially violent, not just during the Algerian 
War of Independence, but from the beginnings of the initial conquest.  Launched in 1830 
“on a trivial pretext” – a slight against a French envoy – “and with little forethought,” 
France’s conquest of Algeria violated international law of the time, with military tactics 
including razing agricultural fields and massacres of civilians, including such methods as 
death by smoke asphyxiation.
30
 The Catholic Church that was subsequently established in Algeria relied on 
patronage from high ranking military officials who held significant power in the colony, 
and the Church primarily catered to the ballooning European settler communities after 
realizing it would make little progress converting the local Muslim population. This 
combination political and economic subordination to secular military powers and the
combination political and economic subordination to secular military powers and the 
absence of a feasible evangelistic mission to the local population led the Church in Algeria 
to be rather quiescent about French colonial violence there, a stance that would only 
change with the bloody Algerian war for independence.  As the war became characterized 
by atrocities committed by French soldiers and by European terrorist groups in Algeria 
(thus compromising the Christian morals of the French colonizers and European settlers 
who comprised the Church’s flock), the Catholic hierarchies of France and Algeria strongly 
condemned these abuses, even promoting conscientious objection by French soldiers. The 
stance of the Church “helped shape public opinion into a willingness to negotiate with the 
Algerian nationalists,” paving the way for French withdrawal. These three key cases, 
Indochina, Senegal and Algeria, demonstrate that French Catholic ideas concerning 
nationalism and evangelism, French church-state relations, and French colonial violence 
were all interconnected and dynamic, changing together over time and within individual 
colonies.
3.4 German (Christian) Nationalism and the Domination of State Over Church
After Chancellor Otto von Bismarck engineered the creation of modern Germany 
through a series of wars and alliances, Bismarck was initially ambivalent about colonial 
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conquests, preferring to focus on consolidating German power within Europe, but 
he was  eventually convinced to pursue a policy of colonial acquisition in Africa and the 
Pacific. During this period, Germany was religiously divided, roughly two-thirds Protestant 
(Lutheran or Reformed) and one-third Catholic. This division played out largely along 
geographical and political boundaries; the governments of the previously independent 
territories that made up Germany had each possessed the authority to determine the official 
religion of their territories, and this policy was maintained once they became states within 
the German Empire.  This arrangement gave the state significant power over German 
churches, but this influence was not reciprocal, and Bismarck specifically sought to limit 
church influence on politics. The Chancellor enjoyed an especially antagonistic relationship 
with the minority Catholic Church. Bismarck feared the doctrine of papal infallibility meant 
that German Catholics would ultimately be loyal to the pope rather than the Kaiser, and the 
Catholic Center Party operated as an opposition party in the Reichstag. Under Bismarck, 
the government of the Prussian state, which formed the heart of the new Germany, 
launched the Kulterkampf, a struggle with the Catholic Church that sought to increase the 
power of the state to control education, influence the appointment of clergy, and regulate 
marriage, among other powers.  Although Bismarck was a devout Protestant, he 
disapproved of the political involvement of all religion, and thus sought to limit the 
influence of Protestant churches as well.  The imperial government thus severely restricted 
the influence of the German Catholic and Protestant churches over German politics, 
including colonial policies.
The German Protestant missionaries who worked in German colonies generally 
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operated through interdenominational missionary societies, such as the Rhenish 
Missionary Society (RMS), purposely operating outside of established church hierarchies, 
viewing the state churches as ineffectual and insufficiently evangelical.  Given that the 
missionary societies were the Christian actors most directly involved in the colonial effort, 
their views concerning colonialism and evangelism are especially relevant.  Like British 
Evangelical missionaries, who heavily influenced and often cooperated with the RMS, the 
Rhenish missionaries came out of a revivalist movement that “stressed the necessity for 
conversion.” In addition to the RMS focus on conversion, the society was international and 
even multiracial in its membership; thus, its members were motivated by evangelism and 
not by a great sense of nationalism tied to Germany or any other state.  In the terms of this 
article, many of the German missionaries were initially motivated by a Christian 
individualist rather than a Christian nationalist orientation. This Christian individualist 
orientation within the RMS did not, however, usually extend to its leadership. Friedrich 
Fabri, who became leader of the Rhenish Mission in 1857, was one of the most vocal 
proponents of German colonial expansion as a way of expanding German culture and 
supporting German economic interests.  During Fabri’s leadership, the Rhenish Mission 
board would “aggressively lobby their government to colonize South West Africa,” a 
request Germany fulfilled in 1884-1885. While Fabri’s ideas seemingly influenced 
Bismarck’s colonial policies, Fabri’s views were opposed by the majority of the missionary 
society and led to Fabri’s resignation from the society in 1884.   
Beyond Fabri’s impact on launching German colonialism, missionaries were largely 
unsuccessful in translating their own evangelical zeal into state colonial policy.  Despite t
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heir independence from the politically-neutered church structures and the fact that 
many missionaries’ presence in colonial areas predated both German colonialism and the 
German Empire itself, Smith notes that these missionary societies “were not an organized 
force,” and “by and large their impact was small” when it came to colonial policies.  The 
political influence of missionary groups on policymaking in the German colonial empire 
was, on the whole, less extensive than in Britain or France, and when missionaries did 
manage to affect policy it was usually because their interests were allied to those of more 
powerful groups. This was largely due in part to a general lack of deep support for 
missionary work in Germany, as compared, for example, to Great Britain, and a consequent 
inability of missionary societies to wield effective political influence in their own rights.
The inability of organizations like the RMS to influence colonial policies in the late 
1880s gave way to subordination of the missionaries to the colonial state, as a more 
nationalist German faction assumed control of the RMS after 1900.  This new leadership 
was less interested in protecting the rights of Africans and willingly assisted with German 
colonial expansion.Thus, by the time of the Herero Uprising of 1904-1907, the Rhenish 
missionaries’ response included preaching a sermon blaming the Herero for “rais[ing] the 
sword against the government which God has placed over you” rather than criticizing the 
genocidal response of German forces to the rebellion. Overall, then, the orientation of 
Protestant missions like the RMS toward colonialism and evangelism was ambivalent, but 
missionary leadership leaned more heavily toward Christian nationalism than Christian 
individualism, and the Protestant missionaries’ political influence was in any event minimal.
Catholic missionaries also operated in German colonies, but in light of the 
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Kulterkampf, Catholics were even less politically involved than their Protestant 
counterparts. Furthermore, the Catholic Center Party, which served as an opposition party 
during most of Bismarck’s time in office, was ambivalent toward German colonialism and 
relatively unconcerned about Catholic missionaries in the colonies. Even after Bismarck’s 
departure as Chancellor in 1890, the colonial administration continued to reflect his 
disregard for missionaries; for example Colonial Secretary Friedrich Lindequist who had
disregard for missionaries; for example, Colonial Secretary Friedrich Lindequist, who had 
risen to this position after overseeing the internment of the Herero in German Southwest 
Africa,  “paid little attention to reformists and missionaries who opposed forced labor and 
favored the Duala” in Cameroon. 
Given the ambivalent but generally nationalist views of German missionaries and 
the relative inability of the German churches and missions to influence colonial policy 
compared to the influence of British or French missions on their respective colonial states, it 
is not surprising that German colonialism, unconstrained by evangelical concerns, was 
particularly violent, as illustrated by the aforementioned Herero uprising in German 
Southwest Africa.  German response to the uprising included a “shoot to kill” order, which 
eventually gave way to a policy of gathering the local populations in concentration camps; 
these tactics eliminated most of the Herero population, as well as that of the Nama, who 
also rebelled.  
Given their political powerlessness and nationalist-inspired views of mission, 
German missionaries responded ambivalently to even such a large scale slaughter. 
Missionaries documented the suffering of the Herero in concentration camps, where 
thousands died from poor conditions and slave labor.
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 These same German missions, however, also participated in the colonial policy by 
taking in thousands of fleeing Herero and subsequently handing them over to German 
authorities for internment. The Maji Maji uprising in German East Africa, which saw one 
of he largest uprisings against European rule on the continent and which was met with 
retaliation that left tens of thousands of dead, was a similarly complicated affair for German 
missionaries, many of whom were targeted by the rebels, and in some cases responded with 
lethal force.  On the one hand, missionaries recognized that the rebellion was largely a 
response to high taxes placed on local people by the German colonial administration and 
violent tactics, including rape and kidnapping, used by tax collectors. On the other hand,
While the German missionaries were in Africa to teach Africans the Gospel and 
its implications for their life and welfare, as Germans working in a German colony 
they believed that the state, as the servant of God, had the duty protect the people 
and to punish evildoers, and they consciously and frankly accepted the protection 
which the German state offered them. In justification they pointed to St. Paul’s 
(Acts 23.23) appeal to his Roman citizenship to insure his right of protection and 
legal procedures … As missionaries they stressed that they themselves would not 
shoot except in self-defense and would not pursue an attacker beyond the borders 
of the mission station; while they prayed to be preserved from the shedding of 
blood, in self-defense they did shoot and kill.  But they regarded the insurgents as 
“the enemy,” and they accepted the execution of a large number of chiefs, though 
deplorable, as a just and rightful action of the state.
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The German missionaries in Africa thus displayed a state-centric, nationalist 
viewpoint, one that conflated their Christianity and their German citizenship and endorsed 
state violence against the “enemy,” regardless of the rightness of the rebels’ cause. 
 It was not only in Africa that missionaries identified with German nationalism and 
violent colonial tactics.  German officials in New Guinea uncovered a 1904 plot by 
inhabitants from several islands to rise up and murder colonizers and missionaries alike; the 
plot was foiled and the Germans spent the next year hunting down the conspirators.  
Although German missionaries felt as though the locals had betrayed them by making them 
specific targets of the plot, their targeting should not have been a surprise given that “the 
Rhenish mission had taken land from the people they wanted to convert, denigrated their 
customs, encouraged exploitation and behaved little differently from other Europeans.”  
The missionary emphasis on controlling land and labor over conversion was evident in the 
fact that the mission had, at that point, been operating in the area for twenty-seven years but 
had only made ninety-six converts. 
Occasionally, German missionaries in Asia objected to colonial violence. In China 
at the time of the anti-Christian Boxer Rebellion, the predominant German mission was 
Catholic rather than Protestant, and it was Catholic clergy who exposed much of the 
German soldiers’ exceptional violence to the rest of the world, although the main impact of 
these exposés was to sow discord between the German colonial and Catholic officials in 
the area.
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 By and large, however, German missionaries, especially those from Protestant 
organizations like the Rhenish Mission Society, identified with the German nationalist 
project and accepted colonial violence, dispossession and forced labor as necessary and 
even useful tools for spreading Germany abroad.  With no significant moderating force 
coming from the politically neutralized and generally nationalistic German churches and 
missionary organizations, German overseas imperialism remained especially violent, even 
by colonial standards.
4 Conclusion
 In a general sense, ideologically based violence is often “evangelical.” Catholic 
Crusaders, Islamic Jihadists, European anarchists, French revolutionaries, German fascists 
and Soviet Marxists have all believed that their ideas were worth spreading and justified the 
killing or subjugation of those who would not voluntarily submit.  In a more specific sense, 
however, Western Christendom has displayed a particular view of itself as possessor of a 
knowledge and way of life that must be propagated throughout the rest of the world. 
Nevertheless, as the focus of evangelism has shifted between nations and individuals, and 
as the level of influence exercised by Christian actors over policy has fluctuated, the 
degrees, circumstances and character of this evangelical violence have changed 
commensurately.  
The preceding analysis has detailed the ways in which British, French and German 
colonialisms, while all inflicting suffering and hardships on millions throughout the Third 
World, differed in the overall degree of violence used by each colonial power.  While there 
are a number of factors and considerations that went into each decision made by a home of
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fice bureaucrat, colonial administrator or soldier on the ground to use or refrain 
from using violence, this article has argued that the influence of Christian actors, 
specifically Catholic and Protestant Churches and missionary groups, played key roles in 
impacting these decisions.  Christian actors, influenced by the theologies of their 
denominations or traditions, as well as the prevailing sentiments of their home countries, 
differed in how they interpreted their “Great Commission” to evangelize the Third World. 
Many such as the Evangelicals of Great Britain or the Catholic missionaries who
Many, such as the Evangelicals of Great Britain or the Catholic missionaries who 
responded to Pope Benedict’s 1919 letter against “missionary nationalism,” placed the 
value of individuals as potential recipients of salvation above allegiance to their home 
nations.  Many other church leaders and missionaries, drawing upon different theological 
traditions and colored by the nationalisms and jingoisms of their cultures, saw God’s 
salvific work as operating largely through nations and states (and particularly through the 
clergy or missionary’s own nation-state), and accepted violence as a necessary and even 
useful tool for spreading both national power and the message of Christ.  Differences in the 
prevalence of these views over time and across countries, as well as variation in the degree 
to which Christian actors could enact their views through state policies, impacted the lives 
of untold millions across the Third World.
This article is one step in the process of understanding the relationships between 
Christian individualism/nationalism, church influence over state policy, and state violence.  
Further work on this topic could more carefully examine the impact that relationships 
between Christian nationalism and other ideas that were influential in Europe during the 
time period in question, such as racial hierarchies, social Darwinism, socialism and fascism.  
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Another expansion of this study would be to examine more closely how different 
political systems, such as democracy or authoritarianism, influenced the ability of churches 
and other religious actors to translate their ideas and preferences into state policies. Still 
another avenue of further research would look at the different methods by which religious 
organizations can influence state policies, such as direct institutional access, alliance with 
political parties, lobbying, and opposition activities through civil society or social 
movements.
A further extension would apply this framework to other instances of First World-
Third World interactions throughout history. One potentially fruitful application for 
historians and other scholars would be examine earlier periods of First World intervention 
that had explicitly Christian motivations, such as the Crusades and the colonization of the 
New World.  When Pope Urban II launched the First Crusade in 1095, his goal was to 
spread the reach of the Church within the Holy Land primarily by controlling the region, 
with littler regard for attempting to convert the local Muslim population: “Christianization 
of territory” rather than “Christianization of population.”
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 Urban’s Crusade spawned the idea that Christians could engage in holy war, 
“bellum sacrum,” which allowed for unrestrained violence against the “enemies of God” 
who occupied Palestine. Columbus and later conquistadors similarly approached the 
indigenous peoples of the Americas as “enemies” to be eliminated or exploited,  and the 
Catholic Church was heavily involved in coordinating he conquest of his new territory by 
European powers, such as Spain and Portugal.  Yet, during these time European 
campaigns, there were voices within the Catholic Church that urged restraint and espoused 
principles that would be echoed in later ideas of evangelism and Christian individualism.   
This analysis can also be applied to the foreign policy of the United States, a 
country that has long combined a strong separation of church and state with a democratic 
system that allows for the de facto influence of religion to remain fairly high.  Such an 
analysis of the influence of Christian nationalism and individualism on American 
interventions in the Third World could range from examining the brief foray into 
colonialism that the United States attempted following its acquisition of the Philippines 
territory during the Spanish-American War through the period of Cold War intervention to 
the current paradigm of “humanitarian intervention” (a concept that was initially invented 
specifically to protect (Western) Christians living in Third World settings). Such an analysis 
would explore the roles that American religious groups, such as Evangelical Christians, 
play in contemporary foreign policy, as well as the extent to which secular ideas concerning 
human rights and non-religious actors dedicated to these ideas can influence policy through 
civil society or other means.
Finally, a complete analysis of First World violence against the Third World would 
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examine the topic from the latter’s perspectives.  Third World nations and regions 
have not simply been passive victims of First World aggression, and their responses to such 
interventions are important.  Third World populations have also long been active in the 
global Church; efforts to indigenize the clergy of many churches coincided with 
movements toward decolonization, and the centers of gravity for many of the world’s 
largest Christian denominations and movements, including Catholicism, Anglicanism and 
Evangelicalism, have moved to the global South, with implications for both the views 
espoused by these branches of Christianity and their ability to influence the West. 
Overall, this topic is not only important from a historical standpoint.  American 
policies continue to be influenced by religious actors, notably the American Evangelical 
movement that has rivaled its British forerunners for political activism. The Catholic 
Church in recent years has spoken in increasingly critical of the types of interventions it 
once championed, and the leaders and core memberships of the world’s largest Christian 
denominations and movements increasingly come from the Third World. With the global 
landscape shaped by such developments, the issue of Christian influence over Western 
violence against non-Western nations remains a crucial concern for First and Third World 
populations alike. 
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